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Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 Research on the death penalty in China today encounters a  good many difficulties.
Some aspects of the question are regarded as a state secret. It is a taboo subject that
does  not  lend  itself  easily  to  open  discussion.  As  a  consequence,  the  available
information is mostly in the form of piecemeal and disparate documents and rumours.
These factors feed into an ethical and political debate that is not greatly amenable to
scholarly study. This article does not claim to analyse the way the death penalty is
applied, but intends rather to refocus the discussion that is currently exercising the
minds  of  certain  Chinese  legal  scholars.  In  doing  so,  it  offers  some  insight  into  a
developing consciousness.
2 If the issue of the death penalty is a particularly serious one in China, it is so by virtue
of the systematic way in which it  is  applied. Whilst the exact figure is shrouded in
secrecy,  one often hears  of  a  minimum of  several  hundred,  even several  thousand,
executions a year, and it is common to see estimates whereby China alone carries out
more  executions  than  all  other  countries  combined.  According  to  Amnesty
International, from 1990 to 1999, 27,599 people were sentenced to capital punishment
in China, and 18,194 of these were executed. The average annual number of sentences is
therefore estimated to be at least 2,759, 1,802 of which are put into effect
1
.  Another
report by this organisation notes that of the 1,526 people executed in 31 countries in
2002,  1,060  were  conducted  by  the  Chinese  legal  system,  which  is  thus  thought  to
represent two-thirds of the number of capital punishments carried out worldwide
2
.
3 This situation regularly gives rise to criticism by the international  community that
makes an appeal to ethics and human rights, without always being well informed about
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the historical and cultural conditions in the case of China. An entirely new situation has
come about in recent times (the year 2000 seems to mark a turning-point, as that was
the moment  in  China  itself  when serious  discussion  of  the  death  penalty  began,  a
debate that is led by a new generation of legal scholars
3
. 
4 In April 2000, a debate was organised by the Law Institute at Peking University on “the
morality  of  the  death  penalty”.  This  initial  debate,  which  dealt  especially  with
principles, was followed by another, in November 2002, based on one particular case. In
December of  the same year,  an international  symposium on the death penalty  was
jointly organised by the Institute of Legal Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, the Danish Centre for Human Rights and the University of Xiangtan (Hunan),
a meeting which allowed for the airing of broader international perspectives. 
5 My approach in this article is two-pronged. I will begin by characterising the new spirit
that presides over the current discussions. I will then attempt, through a presentation
of some concrete cases, to indicate how the burden of the Maoist legacy continues to
bear on the penal situation in China, and more particularly on the application of the
death penalty.
The new spirit of debate 
6 A  first  change  of  great  significance  was  the  emergence  of  an  openly  abolitionist
approach.  In  the  spring  of  2000,  during  the  debate  on  the  “morality  of  the  death
penalty” held at Peking University, this distinctly minority approach was represented
in particular by Qiu Xinglong, a Law Professor
4
. His argument broadly took up Western
themes that have become classic among abolitionists.  These concern the limits of a
conception  of  justice  seeking  retribution  and  the  utilitarian  critique  of  the
effectiveness  of  the  death  penalty.  But  it  also  includes  reflection on the  particular
barriers in the way of abolition in the case of China. First of all, there is the weight of a
cultural tradition that supposedly places less importance on the individual person than
does  the  Western  “humanist”  tradition.  According  to  Qiu  Xinglong,  China  is  still
waiting for its Beccaria, and the arguments advanced by the Chinese jurists are less
based on a principled approach than on considerations of opportunity. Account must
also be taken of the effects of an anti-religious policy undertaken in mainland China in
the twentieth century. History shows that the abolitionist gains in the West and Japan
were made possible by the existence of  a  religious undercurrent,  be it  Christian or
Buddhist
5
. But in China today there is no longer any belief (xinyang) in the particular
dignity  of  human life,  which has  only  one  value  calculable  in  money terms.  These
circumstances are aggravated by the legal mindset and by the country’s current judicial
practice of having recourse to the death penalty as a matter of routine. Such a situation
makes any abolitionist education of the Chinese public difficult.
7 Opposed to this radical position, expressed with passionate conviction, is an attitude
that  is  more  representative  of  the  new  generation  of  Chinese  legal  experts.  Chen
Xingliang
6
,  a Professor at Peking University,  is one of the leading exponents of this
approach, thanks to his active role in promoting debate and publications
7
. He defends
the principle of the abolitionist ideal, at the same time as judging it to be impracticable
in the current situation. The moral necessity of abolishing the death penalty cannot be
undermined  in  the  name  of  considerations  based  on  the  existence  of  criminality.
Accordingly, Chen Xingliang, asks whether the Europe of Beccaria was any less violent
than today’s China. On the other hand, abolition requires conditions which, in his view,
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do not yet exist. China remains under-developed, both materially and culturally. The
death penalty is regarded by the authorities and the population alike as an economical
and efficient measure
8
. What is under discussion therefore is not abolition as such, but
the strict limitation of capital punishment. It is a gradual humanisation of the law that
will one day make the abolitionist ideal something that can be realised. Chen Xingliang
remarks that Europe first outlawed inhumane treatment such as torture before putting
an end to capital punishment
9
.
8 A second dimension to current debates among Chinese lawyers is that we are starting
to see  some consideration of  the particular  historical  experience of  modern law in
China. In fact, we may speak of a gradual reconstruction of judicial memory, in spite of
the ongoing existence of many different kinds of amnesia. The example of the great
reformers of the late Qing dynasty, in particular Shen Jiaben, who was responsible for
the first modernisation of Chinese criminal law, is being put forward
10
. Whereas in the
1980s the early signs of modernity were identified with the May 4th 1919 movement,
from the 1990s it was the reformist experience of late imperial times that was being
positively  reassessed
11
.  The  attempt  to  rationalise  and humanise  the  death penalty,
which started with Shen Jiaben (with the limitation of crimes liable to attract capital
punishment, the end of public executions and the abolition of cruel punishment and
legal torture), was regarded as the first stage in a necessary process of self-limitation
by the Chinese state, before any possible introduction of an abolitionist policy.
9 On the other hand, the republican era, which showed some progress in the codification
and implementation of the instruments of a modern judicial system, still remains little
discussed. Yet an initial debate on the death penalty, in which abolitionist points of
view were  aired,  did  take  place
12
,  and  this  was  taken up on  Taiwan in  the  1980s
13
.
However,  despite  the  points  of  continuity  with  the  late  imperial  period
14
,  this
republican  heritage  is  still  a  long  way  from  being  at  the  surface  of  the  collective
memory.
10 Nonetheless, the current debate has the merit of providing a thorough re-examination
of  the Chinese communist  experience and of  highlighting the contradictions of  the
current policy.
Current contradictions : some case studies
11 Four practices inherited from the Maoist period are the subject of some debate in China
at the present time.
An instrumental conception of the legal system
12 An initial continuity, and a well-known one, is an instrumental conception of the legal
system which makes it subject to ideological and political imperatives in contempt of
any procedural conception of justice. This conception, which already appeared at the
time  of  the  Jiangxi  soviet  (1927-1934),  was  developed  during  the  “correction
movement” of the years 1941-1942 in Yan’an and tragically unfolded throughout the
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). It was essentially characterised by an excessive use of
the death penalty to eliminate internal enemies according to the political needs of the
movement and by its “recourse to trials in which procedures were legally expeditious
and politically more elaborate” and to “mass public judgments followed by the physical
elimination of people”
15
. The Deng Xiaoping era claimed to break with these practices
and expressed a willingness to return to a system in which there would be respect for
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the law in the management of social affairs. But Maoist habits persisted and the “Strike
Hard” campaigns (yanda) that began to be introduced from 1983 on remained marked
by the Maoist legacy, even if they claimed to be promoting law over ideology. 
13 To give just one or two examples of this, let us consider the Sun Zhigang affair. This
young graduate, who had come to Canton in search of work, was killed whilst being
held in a detention centre in the spring of 2003. He had been arrested for failing to
produce his identity papers, and died in the centre’s infirmary following an attack on
him by fellow detainees that had been encouraged by a nurse. This affair stirred a lively
debate,  including  the  participation  of  academics,  on  the  situation  of  migrants  in
society. A dozen people directly implicated were subsequently given various sentences.
These  included the  death penalty  for  two of  those  found guilty,  one  of  whom was
quickly executed in order to calm “public outrage” (minfen)
16
. 
14 Another  recent  case,  that  of  Sun  Yanhui,  reported  by  the  journalist  Pierre  Haski
highlighted  the  lack  of  separation  that  persists  between  the  judicial  and  political
functions of  the state at  the local  level.  Sun Yanhui was a man in his  thirties who
belonged to a criminal gang in Suzhou. He was arrested in late 2003 after robbing a
businessman,  who was a  Chinese living abroad,  in  his  hotel  room. Sun Yanhui  was
armed at the time of his police arrest. He was executed on January 10th 2005 in Suzhou.
Although  there  was  no  physical  violence  involved  and  he  did  not  use  his  weapon
against  the police,  and despite a  petition being signed by around fifteen university
professors in Peking, the local tribunal wanted to set an example. According to local
cadres, it  was about “showing that the city in which there has been a good deal of
foreign investment is able to deal severely with crimes against businessmen”
17
.  Such
subordination of the judicial to the political remains widespread.
The death sentence with a two-year suspension of execution
15 There remain more technical aspects, peculiar to the Maoist period, whose effects are
still felt in the judicial sphere. A case in point is the innovation in 1951, attributed to
Mao Zedong, of the “death penalty with a two-year suspension of execution”. In 1951,
at  the  height  of  the  Movement  to  suppress  counter-revolutionaries  (1950-52),  Mao
launched his policy whereby “those whose crimes deserve capital punishment but who
own no blood debts (meiyou xiezhai) and not bitterly hated by the people (minfen buda),
or  who  have  done  serious  but  not  extremely  serious  harm  to  the  state  could  be
sentenced to death with a two-year suspension of execution and subjected to forced
labour in the hope that they will mend their ways”
18
. This measure was then applied in
order to limit the growing number of people sentenced to death for political reasons
and  to  open  up  the  possibility  of  a  political  re-education.  It  was then  gradually
generalised and applied to other sorts of crime, for example in 1952 against “corrupt
elements” (tanwu fenzi), in the course of the “three-antis” campaign. It first figured in
the Project of the guiding principles of criminal law in the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo xingfa  zhidao caoan)  of  1954 before being integrated,  in a modified
form, into the criminal Code from 1979
19
. 
16 The particular conditions of the emergence of this practice have led lawyers to debate
the following three questions : is this invention unique, peculiar to Chinese criminal
law ? Should this practice be retained or abolished today ? Can “the death penalty with
a  two-year  suspension  of  execution”  be  considered  independently  of capital
punishment ? 
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17 Some current advocates of retaining this practice are quick to point out that it is part
of a judicial system that is peculiarly Chinese, precedents for which could be found in
the “Autumn assizes”
20
 of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Others try to find similarities in
the criminal law of other countries in order to confirm its universal character
21
, putting
forward five main arguments for this : the existence of the death penalty makes the
possibility of a reprieve desirable ; this sentence cannot be substituted for one of life or
long-term imprisonment ; this sentence severely condemns criminals at the same time
as allowing them a chance to repent ;  compared to the death sentence, it  reflects a
humanitarian concern ; it is a sentence with a very distinct character, which means
that there is no particular problem arising from its application
22
.
18 Before presenting the opposite view, it will be useful to compare the practice of “the
death sentence with a two-year stay of execution” with that of the “autumn assizes”.
Both of these practices may be seen as an application of the principle of prudence when
having recourse to the death penalty, but for quite different reasons. The spirit of the
“death  penalty  with  a  two-year  stay  of  execution”  was  somehow  a  quantitative
measure, of which the goal was merely to limit the number of death sentences, whereas
the rationale of the “autumn assizes” was above all to avoid judicial mistakes. Secondly,
the  definition  of  crimes  subject  to  the  “death  penalty  with  a  two-year  stay  of
execution” is still not explicit enough. The criterion that presides over the decision to
“kill or not kill” the criminal (kesha ke busha) remains indeterminate, as in the case of
serious crimes that “do not involve any blood debt or cause any public outrage”. On the
other hand, the criteria used for cases that could be heard by the “autumn assizes”
were clearly defined. These were :  (1)  circumstances deserving of the death penalty
(qingshi)  (among  the  four  categories,  this  alone  led  to  an  actual  execution) ;  (2)
circumstances deserving of a deferred execution (huanjue) ; (3) circumstances deserving
of compassion (kejin) : the elderly, young children, the mentally ill, only children with
elderly or sick parents ;  and (4) suspicious circumstances (keyi).  Thirdly, a review of
cases  where  the  “death  penalty  with  a  two-year  suspension  of  execution”  can  be
imposed  is  much  more  expeditious  than  that  of  the  “autumn  assizes”  where  four
reviews were required before the execution could take place
23
. 
19 It is therefore quite natural that those in favour of abolishing the “death penalty with a
two-year stay of execution” stress the modern character of this practice, introduced in
a very different context to that of the imperial tradition. It is meaningful only in a state
based on the pre-eminence of ideology over law. They also emphasise its ambiguous
nature  and  the  difficulties  of  its  application.  Thus,  this  sentence  can  scarcely  be
regarded as humane, since it puts the condemned in a state of anxiety for the two years
of  their  reprieve.  Furthermore, it  is  not  an  autonomous  sentence,  as  it  remains
dependent upon a death sentence. It therefore raises problems of assessing the gravity
of the crimes and the practical application of the sentence
24
. Finally, experience shows
that it can lead to injustices, in so far as someone who has been condemned to death
and who takes advantage of this measure can in the end have their sentence reduced
and thus find themselves in a more favourable situation than someone who has simply
received a prison sentence.
20 Zhao Zuojun
25
, who is in favour of maintaining this practice, has a critical but pragmatic
approach to the question, seeing in it the means of reducing the number of executions.
It is true that those who are condemned to immediate execution represent 75 % of
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cases, as against 25 % only for sentences with a reprieve. Retaining this measure is
therefore seen as desirable by this  writer on legal  affairs,  if  it  could constitute the




21 Many studies have been done on this subject, but they are of a theoretical character.
What is lacking is precise data based on specific cases. However, this practice poses
some serious problems, in particular if one considers the review procedures that have
been laid  down.  According to  Article  146 of  the  1979 code of  penal  procedure and
Article 201 of the 1997 code, death sentences with a two-year stay of execution are
given by an intermediate tribunal (zhongji renmin fayuan) and must be approved by a
higher court. In actual fact, the ambiguities of this procedure do not encourage any
appeal  of  the decision,  as this  would involve taking the risk of  receiving a harsher
sentence, to wit, the immediate application of the death penalty.
The decentralisation of the power of reviewing the death penalty
22 A third legacy of the Maoist era, and a subject of some debate, is the decentralisation of
the power of review in cases where the death penalty can be imposed. In a certain way,
this is about the question of continuity and discontinuity characteristic of the evolution
of judicial  practices from the end of  the Empire to today,  including the republican
period, and the Maoist and Deng Xiaoping eras. It is possible to trace formal elements
of continuity that are of sufficient importance that I could suggest in another study
27
that it was enlightening to bring together such diverse historical experiences under the
notion of “exceptional practices”. Thus, it is possible to consider that the practice of
the “provincialisation” of the power of review is not a new phenomenon in the legal
history of China, since it already appeared under the Qing, most notably during the
Taiping insurrection (1851-1864)
28
. This practice naturally had a different meaning in
the  modern  era  under  Deng  Xiaoping.  The  question  then  becomes :  what  does  an
imperial  power  confronted  with  the  dual  threat  of  internal  rebellion  and  foreign
intervention have in common with a sovereign communist state assured of holding
monopoly  on  legal  violence ?  A  certain  continuity  can  be  found  in  the  underlying
political culture ever since the crisis of the imperial state : in a context of war or civil
conflict  that  has  persisted  practically  unabated,  it  leads  to  a  generalisation  and
radicalisation of state violence in society.
23 Naturally, the communist era (which should not be treated in a undifferentiated way,
since we need to distinguish between times of radical political mobilisation and times
of relative stabilisation) presents particular features. We can talk of a decentralisation
of  the  death  penalty,  but  in  a  sense  that  is  strictly  speaking  neither  juridical  nor
administrative.  Under  Mao,  both  before  and  after  1949,  we  can  see  the  persistent
phenomenon whereby there was delegation to the local  levels  of  the power to kill,
particularly pronounced during the successive political “movements”. It was a question
of spreading this power through the body politic to which no law gave legitimacy but
which nonetheless obeyed certain rules. This power was subject to directives that were
ideological in nature and were applied (or reinterpreted) by the local levels of a Party
structure. This structure continued to exist even when it  was contested by internal
factionalism.
24 The absence of any transparency makes it difficult to understand concretely how such
judicial  practices,  which  have  yet  to  be  adequately  studied,  functioned  under
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communism. The Maoist period distinguished itself in fact by the absence of any legal
code. The period ushered in by Deng Xiaoping was formally characterised by a legal
dualism that was gradually institutionalised and that makes one think of the republican
era :  similarly  to  the  Guomindang,  the  Communist  Party  promoted,  alongside  duly
elaborated penal codes, a continuous set of exceptional measures aimed at repressing
particular categories of criminals. The Maoist legacy no longer took up the whole of the
scene, but it did play a decisive role alongside practices and institutions regulated by
the new judicial codes. This is particularly in evidence through the recourse to targeted
campaigns  like  those  aimed  at  economic  criminality.  Although  a  Penal  Code  was
adopted in  1979 (for  the first  time under  the communist  regime),  these  anti-crime
campaigns were based on statutory provisions that sometimes contradicted the letter
of the law and thus had an exceptional character. In particular, the “Decision of the
Standing  Committee  of  the  National  People’s  Congress  regarding  the  question  of
approval of cases involving death sentences” subsequently became a document whose
role has been decisive. It has not only allowed a broadening of the application of the
death penalty, but also a decentralisation of the review of cases concerning murder,
looting, rape, etc. On the other hand, the power of review for counter-revolutionary
and corruption cases has remained centralised
29
. An understanding of this phenomenon
of  centralisation  or  decentralisation  of  state  violence  would  require  a  subtle
interpretation  of  the  relations  between  “the  institutional”  and  “the  exceptional”,
which goes beyond the scope of the present article. 
25 One case which recently gave rise to a lively debate was that of a condemned man by
the name of Dong Wei. This case clearly illustrates the weak authority of the Supreme
Court in review procedures. Dong Wei, a migrant worker, was sentenced to death for
murder by the intermediate tribunal of the municipality of Yan’an on December 21st
2001. His lawyer, Zhu Zhanping engaged during a second court’s judgment, disagreed
with this decision and addressed an urgent appeal on April 27th 2002 to the Supreme
Court which ordered an immediate stay of execution. But on August 26th 2002, the High
Court of the province of Shaanxi insisted on the upholding of the original sentence of
the first instance. Dong Wei was executed 129 days after the stay of sentence ordered
by the Supreme Court
30
.
26 What was he accused of ? Dong Wei was a 26 year-old peasant farmer from Zizhou in
Shaanxi province, who found work in Yan’an. According to his statement, at dawn on
May 2nd 2001, he went with two girls to a local dance hall. The girls went in with their
tickets, but before he could do so he was stopped by a certain Song Yang who said to
him : “You have two girls,  give  me the tall  one for  the  night”,  to  which Dong Wei
responded : “Go home and sleep with your own”. Song then took off his leather belt and
started striking Dong with it. They were pulled apart by bouncers, whereupon Song
went off. Dong then called the two girls on their mobile to ask them to leave the hall
with him. Just then, Song came back with his friends. They grabbed hold of Dong Wei
who, despite being on his knees, found a brick with which he smashed Song Yang on
the head. With the second blow, Song went limp and Dong managed to escape. 
27 The sole witness to this scene was a motorcyclist, Jin Yansheng, who claimed to have
seen  Dong  smash  Song’s  head  several  times  over.  This  detail  was  used  as  a  main
argument in the first trial, the upshot being that Dong Wei was sentenced to death for
murder
31
. Dong appealed, but this was rejected by the Higher Court which confirmed
the earlier judgment.
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28 Zhu Zhanping, Dong Wei’s lawyer insists on the deficiencies of the case : the evidence
was not sufficient to prove that the act was deliberate ; some witnesses could not even
be found and the testimony of the sole witness was riddled with contradictions ; the
homicide was a reaction to the humiliating and violent behaviour of the victim. In spite
of the Supreme Court’s judgment, which accepted these arguments, Dong Wei was put
to death in conformity with the judgment of the local court. 
29 This  relatively  banal  case  highlights  the  arbitrary  character  of  the  considerations
presiding over the application of the death penalty in China. Thus, a single witness
decides on someone’s life and death. It also indirectly illustrates the problematic status
of lawyers in the legal system. Generally speaking, the majority of lawyers in China do
not want to be involved with cases that are liable to attract the death penalty. Civil
cases are less problematic and often more lucrative. The lawyer’s defence is not taken
seriously into account by the court. Thus, in the case in question, other witnesses called
by the defence were not summoned by the second court. 
30 This trial illustrates above all the danger of one of the innovations of the communist
era, the decentralisation of the review of the death penalty, henceforth decided by local
magistrates rather than by the Supreme Court. This practice goes against the imperial
tradition of the centralisation of the death penalty, which had been maintained by the
republican regime. It causes confusion between the second court’s judgment and the
appeal and is a source of arbitrariness.
Exceptional practices, such as the “Strike Hard” campaigns 
31 More broadly–and this is a fourth legacy of the communist practice–the concern of
those engaging in the current debate is manifest faced with what they recognise as a
fundamental  contradiction  in  official  policy.  The  appeal  to  a  “government  by  law”
(fazhi),  something  that  is  indispensable  to  economic  and  social  development,  is
incompatible with the continuation of exceptional practices symbolised by the various
waves of “Strike Hard” campaigns launched in 1983, 1996, 2001 and 2004
32
.
32 This practice originally aimed to eliminate expeditiously those who were threatening
public order or were responsible for economic crimes. It was underpinned by special
statutory  provisions  which  enabled  the  fast-tracking  of  procedures  and  thus
significantly increased the number of cases liable to attract the death penalty. 
33 In  an internet  article  that  has  been available  since  May 15th 2004,  Zhao Zuojun is
critical of the following phenomenon : “Certain local courts have gone as far as to turn
the number of death sentences made public into the litmus test of their seriousness in
the application of the ‘Strike Hard’ policy”. He regrets the fact that there has been little
hesitation in applying capital punishment systematically to crimes liable to attract this
sentence,  leaving  it  up  to  the  appeal  courts  to  review  and  commute  them.  This
interpretation leads to abuse.  Thus,  at  the time of the “Strike Hard” campaign, the
capital of one province (which is not named) executed 31 people in three days (between
January 13th and 15th 1999), at the municipal level alone
33
. 
34 In a paper delivered at Peking University in 2003, Qu Xinjiu, a Professor of Legal and
Political Science at the university, points out the arbitrariness of this system and its
dangers  for  Chinese  society  due  to  the  confusion  between  judicial  procedure  and
political campaigning, the retention of practices theoretically banned (the parading of
the condemned in public), the threat to human rights, the absence of any control over
the instrument of repression
34
.
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35 Finally,  this  “Strike  Hard”  practice  contributes  to  maintaining,  in  spite  of  official
appeals to questions of legality, a fundamental characteristic of the modern Chinese
legal system, which is the duality between the normative texts (like the penal Codes)
and special statutory provisions suspending the application of ordinary laws according
to the needs of those in power. This double structure, which goes back to late imperial
times, was institutionalised during the civil wars of the republican era and remains at
the core of the current legal system
35
. 
36 The preservation of these exceptional practices is all the more worrying in that they
complement provisions that have been made even harsher in the new Criminal Code.
Thus,  as  Chen  Xingliang  points  out,  the  1997  Code  is  from  this  point  of  view a
regression with respect to the 1979 one (for example, 68 crimes instead of 28 are today
liable to attract the death penalty)
36
. This increased repression is also aggravated by the
ambiguous nature of the provisions : for example, the application of the death penalty
can be extended in cases of “extremely serious crimes” (zuixing jiqi yanzhong).
37 The  debates  on  the  abolition  or  limitation  of  the  death  penalty  in  which  the  new
generation of Chinese jurists are engaged are therefore occurring in a difficult context.
They remain circumscribed, but the open and public nature of them, and the critical
reflection that they are fostering on the history of penal practices in China, constitute a
development worthy of note. The report presented this year by the head of the People’s
Supreme  Court  on  improving  the  process  of  review  of  the  death  penalty
37
 is  not
unrelated  to  these  debates. The  People’s  Supreme  Court  intends  to  improve  the
judgments handed down in the court of appeal for criminal cases and to take back the
power of final review in cases of capital punishment. According to an official estimate,
these two measures could quickly reduce the number of executions by 30%. To achieve
this goal, the central government has suggested that the Supreme Court set up a special
tribunal for reviewing cases liable to attract the death penalty, with offices in the major
administrative regions. Several initiatives have already been taken in this direction.
According to Chen Weidong, a Law professor at the People’s University, three courts
have been established to deal countrywide with the review of cases where the death
sentence has been handed down, and 300 provincial court judges have been transferred
to the central judicial corps to work on the implementation of this reform
38
.
38 Over the past few years, debate has not been confined to intellectual circles. There are
many people in official positions in the field of law who have been actively engaged in
it by making their opinions (albeit their personal opinions) known on the abolition or
limitation of the death penalty.  Notable cases in point are those of Hu Yanteng, an
expert  in  the  theory and practice  of  the  death penalty  and Deputy-Director  of  the
Research Institute for Judicial Policy at the Supreme Court ; Cao Kangtai, the director of
the office of legal affairs at the Council for State Affairs ; Zhou Daoluan, a Professor at
the  National  College  for  Magistrates,  and  Huang  Songyou,  Vice-President  of  the
People’s  Supreme Court.  Following the expression of these various positions,  Zhang
Jun, Deputy-Minister of Justice, declared on January 16th 2005, at a national forum of
young criminal  lawyers  on “the contemporary criminal  code and the  protection of
human rights”, that “the important thing is to reform the penal system so that the
death penalty can be replaced by long prison sentences”
39
. 
39 Some  jurists  and  legislators  therefore  acknowledge  the  need  to  abolish  the  death
penalty over the long term, at the same time as strictly confining it in its current form.
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But this consciousness is still far removed from the great bulk of the population, 88% of
which say that they are in favour of the death penalty, according to a poll carried out in
2002
40
. Faced with an increase in criminality, and given a largely hostile public opinion,
these  experts  propose  various  scenarios  to  bring  about  the  gradual  victory  of  the
abolitionist position. Hu Yunteng thus talks about the possibility of abolition in a very
distant future (a hundred years), while suggesting that 15 categories of crime should no
longer be subject to the death penalty. Others propose a process of abolition in stages,
by making distinctions between various categories of crime. Such a step would first
apply to white-collar crimes, then to non-violent criminal acts (feibaoli fanzui), before
finally involving the generalised abolition of the death penalty in China. 
NOTES
1. Amnesty International People’s Republic of China. Death Penalty 1999, February 2001,
London. 
2. Overview of the death penalty worldwide in 2003, http ://
www.richard.clark32.btinternet.co.uk/overview.html. In virtue of the rules observed
by Amnesty International, these statistics are minimum estimates only, listing duly
identified cases. My own observations and those of Chinese legal experts do not
contradict the general conclusion that can de deduced from these reports. Thus, Chen
Zhonglin, the Head of the Law Faculty at the Political Science and Law University of the
South-West and a member of the National People’s Assembly, declared on March 15th
2004 that China executes “about 10,000 people a year” (AFP, March 15th 2004). In the
absence of any official figures provided by the central government and in virtue of the
decentralised nature of the review of the death penalty since 1981, it is only possible to
collect data from the local press. That does not of course diminish the responsibility of
the central government in this penal practice. The international community is not
wrong to criticise the lack of transparency of official data. Indeed, contrary to the
practices of the nationalist government in mainland China before 1949 and on Taiwan
subsequently, the present Chinese state does not publish national figures. This does not
mean, however, that the death penalty is a “secret” in China, since, according to the
penal procedure in place from 1979 to 1997, “Execution of sentences of death shall be
publicly announced but shall not take place in public view”” (Article 155 from 1979 and
Article 212 from 1997). See The Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law of China,
Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1984, p. 165 ; Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong
fa (Penal Procedural Code), Peking, Zhongguo fazhi chubanshe, 2000, p. 41.
3. The first modern study in China on the death penalty was by Shen Jiaben
(1840-1913), a law reformer of the late Qing dynasty. Among his contributions to the
reform of the death penalty can be cited the abolition of capital punishment such as 
lingchi (WW, death by slicing), the reduction of capital offences subject to the death
penalty and the abolition of public executions. The debate between Shen Jiaben and
Okada Asatarô on the reduction of the death penalty to a single type informs us that he
was aware of the abolitionist movement in the West, although he himself was not in
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favour of abolition. See “Sixing weiyi shuo” (On the reduction of the death penalty to a
single type), Jiyi wencun, Vol. 1, Taipei, Shangwu, 1976. 
4. Qiu Xinglong, who was born in Xiangxiang in Hunan province in 1963, is currently
Dean of the Law Faculty at the University of Xiangtan in Hunan province. A committed
abolitionist, he is one of the few intellectuals to come out publicly in favour of the
abolition of the death penalty. 
5. Even though it existed in law, the death penalty was not actually implemented
during the last one hundred years of Ancient Rome. In China, the death penalty was
rarely used during the reign of Tang Emperor Xuanzong (712-756). It is especially worth
noting that in Japan at about the same time, beginning in 724, the death penalty was
actually abolished, and miraculously, it was not used for 347 years after that. The
reason for this was the influence of Christianity on the late Roman Empire, on the one
hand, and of Buddhism in eighth century China and Japan on the other. In the West, the
thinkers of the Enlightenment integrated Christian beliefs into the sacred character of
life (granted by God) in the doctrine of the social contract, thereby laying an important
basis for the abolition of the death penalty. See Qiu Xinglong, “Sixing de dexing” (The
morality of the death penalty), in Qiu Xinglong (ed.), Comparative Criminal Law, special
issue on the death penalty, Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 1-15. The English version was published in
Zhang Ning (ed.), “The Debate over the Death Penalty in China Today”, Contemporary
Chinese Thought, Vol. 36, No. 3, Spring 2005, pp. 9-25.
6. Born in 1957 in Yiwu in Zhejiang province, Chen Xingliang, who holds a doctorate in
legal science from the People’s University, is currently Sub-Dean of the Law Faculty at
Peking University and the Vice-President of its Law Institute. He regularly organises
high quality debates within his Institute.
7. Since 1999, Chen Xingliang and his legal colleagues Chen Ruihua, Bai Jianjun and
Liang Genlin have been organising a forum called “Beijing daxue xingshifa luntan” or
“Deheng xingshifa luntan” (Deheng Forum on criminal law organised by the Law
Institute of Peking University) for the discussion of theoretical and practical issues of
criminal law, the transcription of these discussions being subsequently published. Fazhi
de shiming (The Mission of the Rule of Law), Peking, Falü chubanshe, 2003, was the first
of the 12 debates on penal questions : the reform of the legal system (WWWWWW, sifa
zhidu gaige), procedural justice (WWWW, chengxu zhengyi), the limits of social control,
responses to criminality (WWWWWWWWWWW, helidi zuzhi dui fanzui de fanying),
judicial reform, the morality of the death penalty, the role of judges, lawyers,
legislators, the public prosecutor, the police, academics, etc. Fazhi de jiemian (Aspects of
the Rule of Law), Peking, Falü chubanshe, 2003, brought together accounts of the 12
subsequent discussions on concrete aspects of the current Chinese legal system, for
example, the system of education through work//re-education through labour ?, the
penal policy of “Strike Hard”, case studies, etc. The forthcoming volume is to be
entitled Fazhi de yanshuo (Discourse on the Rule of Law).
8. Chen Xingliang emphasises the fact that “the idea that execution is an adequate
response to a murder can be traced back to distant times past, especially in the
traditional legal culture in China. This has become both a major component of the
social psychology of the Chinese nation and a major hurdle in the path of the abolition
of the death penalty”. Chen Xingliang, “Opinions on Retention versus Abolition of the
Death Penalty”, in Zhang Ning (ed.), 2005, op. cit., pp. 26-34. It is problematic to
consider, as often happens in China, that the traditional expression “a murderer must
be put to death” is so deep-rooted in Chinese culture ever since Antiquity that it would
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constitute in itself an obstacle to an abolitionist position : one may doubt the grounds
for such culturalist approaches. See Zhang Ning, “Kaolun sixing” (A critical
examination of the death penalty), in Niandu xueshu 2004 (Theoria 2004), Peking,
Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, pp. 119-169. See also Jérôme Bourgon, “‘Sauver la
vie’. De la fraude judiciaire en Chine à la fin de l’empire” (‘Saving Life’. On judicial fraud
in China in the late imperial period), in, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, No. 133,
June 2000, pp. 32-39. 
9. Chen Xingliang, “Sixing cunfei zhiyi” (Opinions on retention versus abolition of the
death penalty), preface to Chen Xingliang (ed.), Zhongguo sixing jiantao  : yi ‘qiangxia
liuren an’ wei shijiao (An examination of the death penalty in China from the perspective
of the “hold the execution” case), Peking, Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 2003. An
English version of this preface is to be found in Zhang Ning (ed.), 2005, op. cit., pp. 26-34.
10. Li Guilian, Shen Jiaben zhuan (Biography of Shen Jiaben), Peking, Falü chubanshe,
2000  ; Jérôme Bourgon, “Shen Jiaben et le droit chinois à la fin des Qing” (Shen Jiaben
and Chinese law in the late Qing dynasty), doctoral thesis completed at the Ecole des
hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris, 1994.
11. Joël Thoraval, “Conscience historique et imaginaire social  : Le débat intellectuel des
décennies 1980 et 1990” (Historical Consciousness and Social Imagination : Intellectual
Debate in the 1980s and 1990s), Esprit, No. 303, February 2004, pp. 171-183.
12. Frank Dikötter, Crime, Punishment and the Prison in Modern China, London, Hurst and
Co., 2002, pp. 178-181.
13. See Sixing cunfei zhi yanjiu (Studies on the abolition and retention of the death
penalty), Taipei, Fawubu fanzui wenti yanjiu zhongxin, 1991, 190 p.
14. Philip Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China : The Qing and the Republic
Compared, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2001.
15. Jean-Luc Domenach, Chine  : l’archipel oublié (China : The forgotten archipelago),
Paris, Fayard, 1992, pp. 37-57.
16. “Sun Zhigang an jieshen, zhufan zhixing sixing” (End of the judgment in the Sun
Zhigang case, execution of the principal guilty party), See Ouzhou shibao (European
News), June 27th 2003, p. 9.
17. Pierre Haski, “Silence, on exécute” (Silence, an execution is underway), Libération,
February 3rd 2005.
18. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Works by Mao Zedong), Vol. 5, Peking,
Renmin chubanshe, 1977, p. 43.
19. Articles 50 and 51 of the 1977 Criminal Code stipulate this sentence and the
conditions of its reduction. For further information, see Zhang Qiong and Ruan Qilin, 
Mao Zedong xingshi falü sixiang chutan (Preliminary study of Mao Zedong’s thoughts on
the penal system), Peking, Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1991 ; Zhao Zuojun, Sixing
xianzhi lun, (Theory of the limitation of the death sentence), Wuhan, Wuhan daxue
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southern gate.
21. Lu Weiqian, “Sixing de huanxing wenti” (The problem of suspension of execution in
the death penalty), Zhengfa yanjiu (Political science and law research studies), No. 6,
1956, quoted by Zhao Zuojun, op. cit., p. 280.
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Despite the sensitivity of the subject, the death penalty is currently a topic of public discussion
among Chinese legal experts who are now openly wondering about its possible abolition. This
debate is of interest on three counts. First, it goes hand-in-hand with a retrospective reading of
the Chinese penal tradition, highlighting the succession of attempts at modernising criminal law
for  over  a  century.  It  also  shows  the  ever  present  weight  of  the  Maoist  legacy  and  the
contradictions  of  the  present  policy,  caught  between  a  concern  for  legality  and  continuing
recourse to exceptional measures. Lastly, legal professionals and theorists alike are engaging in a
review—based on specific cases—of the particular features of contemporary Chinese society and
culture.
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